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ABSTRACT
Everyone is concerned about the Internet security, yet most
traffic is not cryptographically protected. The usual justifi-
cation is that most attackers are only off-path and cannot in-
tercept traffic; hence, challenge-response mechanisms suffice
to ensure authenticity. Usually, the challenges re-use exist-
ing ‘unpredictable’ header fields to protect widely-deployed
protocols such as TCP and DNS.
We argue that this practice may often only give an illu-
sion of security. We present recent off-path TCP injection
and DNS poisoning attacks, enabling attackers to circum-
vent existing challenge-response defenses. Both TCP and
DNS attacks are non-trivial, yet very efficient and practical.
The attacks foil widely deployed security mechanisms, such
as the Same Origin Policy, and allow a wide range of exploits,
e.g., long-term caching of malicious objects and scripts.
We hope that this article will motivate adoption of crypto-
graphic mechanisms such as SSL/TLS, IPsec and DNSSEC,
and of correct, secure challenge-response mechanisms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1989 [4], experts have been arguing that Internet
security requires cryptographic protocols, ensuring security
against Monster-in-the-Middle (MitM) attackers. A MitM
attacker is located on the path of the communicating parties,
and can manipulate the communication between them in any
way, i.e., intercept, modify, block and inject spoofed packets;
see the MitM Cookie Monster in Figure 1.
The information security community invested huge efforts
in developing cryptographic schemes and protocols, stan-
dards and products, providing security against MitM attack-
ers, such as IPsec, SSL/TLS, Secure-BGP and DNSSEC. In
spite of all these efforts, and although Internet security is
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Figure 1: Off-Path Attacker Network Model.
well recognised to be critical, most Internet traffic is still not
cryptographically protected. For example, we found that
only about 6% of the TCP traffic is cryptographically pro-
tected with SSL/TLS (based on CAIDA dataset of 3 million
packets [7]); and less than 1% of the DNS resolvers enforce
DNSSEC (cryptographic) validation [13].
We believe that the main reason for the underutilisation
of cryptography, is an illusion of security against network-
based attacks, due to two false beliefs. The first false belief,
is that in reality, attackers can rarely obtain MitM capabil-
ities, and even when they can, they are reluctant to do so
since such activities may lead to detection. We claim that
this is incorrect; there are common scenarios where attack-
ers may obtain MitM capabilities, e.g., by accessing wire-
less communication, by manipulations of the (largely un-
protected) routing mechanisms, or by controlling some inter-
mediate device; furthermore, such attacks are often carried
out, without detection and repercussions, e.g., BGP route
hijacking happens frequently [3].
However, in this article, we focus on the second false belief,
which is that current, non-cryptographic, Internet protocols
already provide sufficient protection against typical, com-
mon attackers, and in particular, against off-path attackers.
Unlike a MitM attacker, an off-path attacker cannot ob-
serve or modify legitimate packets sent between other par-
ties, however, it can transmit packets with a spoofed (fake)
source IP address - impersonating some legitimate party, as
illustrated by Off-path Oscar in Figure 1.
Our main goal in this paper is to convince that this second
belief is (also) false, and that current Internet protocols are
often vulnerable even to an off-path attacker. Specifically, we
discuss few recent results, that allow off-path attacks on ba-
sic Internet protocols: traffic injection into TCP connections
and DNS cache poisoning.
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2Note that spoofed packets are used in many attacks, most
notably, in Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Significant ef-
forts are made to make spoofing less readily available to
attackers, most notably ingress filtering (RFC 3704). How-
ever, IP spoofing is still possible via many ISPs, see [1, 6].
The key, to the off-path attacks that we discuss, is cir-
cumvention of challenge-response defenses, which are often
relied upon to distinguish between (spoofed) packets from
an off-path attacker and (legitimate) packets from legiti-
mate communication end point. In order to authenticate
a response from a server, a client sends a random challenge
with the request, which is returned with the response. Since
an off-path attacker, which we dub Oscar, cannot eavesdrop
on packets exchanged between the server and the client, it
appears that he would have to guess the challenge; hence, the
(sufficiently long, random) challenge allows to prevent Oscar
from crafting a packet with a valid challenge. The security
of most Internet applications, e.g., email, web surfing, and
most peer-to-peer applications, relies on challenge-response
mechanisms, mostly as part of the underlying TCP and DNS
protocols. For example, the widely-used web-security mech-
anisms based on cookies and on the ‘same origin policy’ in
general, depend on the security of both TCP and DNS.
Note that, trivially, challenge-response mechanisms are
ineffective against MitM attackers, since they are able to
eavesdrop on the challenges. The false sense of security is
due to the two false beliefs mentioned above: that MitM ca-
pabilities are ‘rarely practical’ and that existing challenge-
response mechanisms, in particular, in TCP and DNS, pro-
vide sufficient defenses against the (weaker and common)
off-path attackers. The belief that off-path attackers cannot
inject traffic into a TCP connection is even stated in RFCs
and standards, e.g., RFC 4953, discussing TCP spoofing at-
tacks. The reasoning is that TCP specifications and imple-
mentations were enhanced to provide security against such
adversaries, who are incapable of eavesdropping to commu-
nication: modern TCP implementations randomise the 32-
bit sequence number [12], and many also randomise the 16-
bit client port [19]. To successfully inject data into a TCP
stream, the attacker must provide valid values in both fields.
Indeed, since its early days, most Internet traffic is carried
over TCP - and is not cryptographically protected, in spite
of warnings [4, 5, 20].
In contrary to this second belief, we argue that there are
(common) situations allowing off-path attacks, i.e., where
Oscar can circumvent challenge-response mechanisms. One
approach [10, 14] exploits IP fragmentation, i.e., division of
IP packets into several fragments where only one fragment
contains the response-field; this allows off-path attacks that
block, modify and even intercept fragments or whole packets
in some scenarios.
However, in this article we focus on another approach:
in order to circumvent deployed challenge-response mecha-
nisms in TCP and DNS, we exploit the fact that to ease
deployment, challenge-response defenses for these protocols
mostly or wholly reuse existing fields; i.e., challenges are
fields which already exist in requests and are echoed in re-
sponses for some other purpose. In TCP, the ‘challenge’ fields
are only reused fields: sequence number and client port; in
DNS, there is a short ‘dedicated’ challenge field (16 bits), but
since it is insufficient to foil attacks, other fields are ‘reused’
as challenges, including source port, source/destination IP
addresses, and the query itself, see RFC 5452.
The use of a randomised (16-bit) source port field, that
maps responses to the client process which issued the re-
quest, is a widely used ‘best practice’ against off-path at-
tacks; see RFCs 6056, 5452 and [16].
We argue that such dual-use of an existing field for challenge-
response, while conveniently allowing deployment of defenses
only on the client side without requiring coordinated adop-
tion by the server, is often vulnerable. Specifically, we dis-
cuss attacks that allow an off-path attacker to learn the
source port and other ‘dual-use’ fields. This allows off-path
TCP injection and DNS cache poisoning.
1.1 History of Off-Path Attacks
TCP and DNS are basic protocols, and off-path attacks
on their authenticity - TCP injection and DNS poisoning
- impact almost all Internet applications. As such, it is a
common belief that they ensure integrity against an off-path
attacker. However, security against off-path (or MitM) at-
tackers was not of the original design goals of these protocols,
and only minimal changes were done to the specifications to
support challenge-response defenses, e.g., selecting identi-
fiers at random.
Indeed, over the years, significant attention and efforts
were dedicated to validating and improving the off-path se-
curity of TCP and DNS - and numerous off-path attacks
were launched, some of them widely publicised. In Figure 2
we present a ‘time-line’ of important attacks and security im-
provements, for both TCP (upper row) and DNS (lower row).
The time-line begins in 1985 with Morris publication of
TCP injection attack based on the use of predictable se-
quence numbers [20], and Bellovin’s seminal paper from
1989 [4], pointing out that security should not be based on
the presumed off-path protection of DNS and TCP. Bellovin
presented vulnerabilities of (some) TCP implementations to
off-path attacks, and discussed potential exploits and de-
fenses.
Unfortunately, in spite of these warnings, until 1995 most
TCP stacks still used trivially-predictable initial sequence
number (ISN). This changed only after the infamous attack
by Mitnick on Shimomura [23], that utilized a TCP injec-
tion. After the attack, many implementations changed to
‘less predictable’ ISN choices. However, in 2001, Zalewski
showed that most implementations are still ‘sufficiently pre-
dictable’, allowing off-path attacks; this motivated adoption
of more random choice of ISNs in most operating systems,
as standardised in RFC 6528.
One additional TCP injection attack was presented in 2004
by Watson [24]. This attack only injected a ‘RST’ packet,
breaking up a connection, and focused on long-lived connec-
tions using known client (and server) ports and addresses,
as used at the time, in particular, by the Internet routing
protocol BGP. To address this concern, many TCP imple-
mentations began also using ‘unpredictable’ client ports.
In 2007, there were two surprising results: (1) a TCP in-
jection attack presented by the pseudonym author klm in
Phrack magazine [18], and (2) a DNS poisoning attack ex-
ploiting poor random-number generators [17]. Both attacks
were clever and significant although with limited scope. In
particular, the attack on TCP worked only against Win-
dows machines, connected directly to the Internet (rather
than via firewall, as usually is the case), and did not handle
concurrent connections.
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Figure 2: Time-line of DNS Poisoning and TCP Injection attacks.
Kaminsky presented an even more significant DNS poison-
ing attack in 2008, which allowed efficient off-path poison-
ing of most DNS resolver implementations at the time [16]
(see Section 2). The response to this attack was rapid adop-
tion of additional ‘patches’, mostly, more challenge-response
fields, increasing the randomisation and therefore (hope-
fully) making the attack impractical; the most notable patch
was source port randomisation (SPR); see RFC 5452.
Following 2008, there were several years without addi-
tional off-path attacks; Kaminsky’s attack was addressed
by SPR and other ‘patches’ to resolvers, and klm’s attack
was impractical and not widely known (due to the unusual
venue). This changed dramatically in 2011-2013, with the
publication of eight new off-path attacks. The first, in 2011,
was an attack on fragmented IP traffic [10]. This was fol-
lowed, by two new DNS poisoning attacks (in 2012 [15] and
2013 [14]), a connection-exposing attack [9] and four TCP
injection attacks [8, 11, 21, 22]. We discuss some of these
attacks in this paper.
1.2 Malicious Agents
Some of the off-path attacks require, in addition to the
spoofing ability, also a malicious agent in the victim’s net-
work or host. We now explain the different agent models.
A user-level zombie is a machine controlled by the adver-
sary, e.g., compromised by malware, in the victim’s network.
There appears to be a significant amount of attacker con-
trolled hosts (zombies) on the Internet.
A puppet [2] is weaker agent: a restricted malicious script
or applet running in web-browser sandbox. Attacks relying
on a puppet agent require (only) that a client in the victim
network ‘surfs’ to the attacker’s web-site, enabling the adver-
sary to run such a script. The script is restricted by same
origin policy (described in RFC 6454), and can only com-
municate via the browser, i.e., request (and receive) HTTP
objects (no access to TCP/IP packet headers).
Puppets are usually easier to obtain and control compared
to zombies, since browsers normally run scripts automati-
cally upon opening a web-site, while zombies require instal-
lation (of malware).
2. DNS CACHE POISONING
Challenge-response mechanisms allow DNS resolvers to
authenticate legitimate DNS responses, thus preventing cache
poisoning by off-path attackers. Until the year 2008 the only
(widely deployed) challenge-response mechanism was the 16-
bit transaction identifier (TXID).
2.1 Kaminsky’s DNS Cache Poisoning
In 2008, Kaminsky [16] presented an efficient cache poi-
soning attack against resolvers which authenticated responses
using only the TXID. We briefly describe this attack. The
attack assumes a known source port, and for concreteness
we used source port 53. The steps of the attack, illustrated
in Figure 3, are the following:
(1) the attacker triggers a DNS request for a random sub-
domain of the victim domain 1$.foo.com. There are different
techniques to trigger DNS requests, e.g., a benign client vis-
its a web page of the attacker; the web page contains an
object from a victim domain, which triggers a DNS request.
(2) the recursive DNS resolver receives a DNS request and
sends a DNS request to the target name server.
(3) the attacker then sends 216 responses with spoofed
source IP (of the name server); each response is a referral,
mapping the name server ns.foo.com to 6.6.6.6, an IP address
controlled by the attacker.
(4) the response containing the correct TXID is accepted,
cached and sent to the client.
(5) authentic DNS response is ignored, since there is no
matching pending request.
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Figure 3: Kaminsky’s Attack.
4Following to Kaminsky’s attack, additional challenge-response
mechanisms were proposed to increase the entropy in DNS
requests (RFC 5452). The most popular mechanism, sup-
ported by most resolvers, is source port randomisation (SPR).
SPR in tandem with TXID, produce a search space of 232
and were believed to provide sufficient protection against
poisoning by off-path adversaries, since this requires the at-
tacker to not only guess the TXID but also the source port
correctly. This reduced the motivation for deployment of the
cryptographic defense against poisoning, DNSSEC (RFCs
4033-4035). We found different techniques, [14, 15], to cir-
cumvent the popular defenses against poisoning by off-path
attackers. In this work we show a simple technique from [15],
which applies to common network scenarios, where the DNS
resolvers are located behind a NAT device (as in Figure 1),
and uses side-channels for ports’ prediction.
2.2 Vulnerability of Resolvers Behind NAT
Network Address Translation (NAT) devices that assign
predictable ports to outgoing packets can expose resolvers
to cache poisoning attack. We show that even NAT devices
that sufficiently randomise outgoing ports may expose re-
solvers to attacks.
Per-Destination NAT.
NAT devices modify ports in outgoing packets, and main-
tain mappings between internal and external ports.
We focus on the common per-destination NAT; see [15]
for other NAT devices. A per-destination NAT operates as
follows: for a tuple defined by <src-IP:src-port,dst-IP:
dst-port,protocol>, it selects the first port at random,
and subsequent ports are increased sequentially (for that
tuple).
Predict-then-Poison Attack.
The off-path attacker, Oscar, controls a zombie, i.e., non-
privileged malware, that runs on a client host in the LAN.
The first phase of the attack is port prediction during
which the zombie and Oscar collaborate to expose the port
that will be allocated to the DNS request of the DNS re-
solver. Then during the second phase, Kaminsky’s attack
is launched. We present only the predict phase of the at-
tack, which steps are illustrated in Figure 4; the steps of
Kaminsky’s cache poisoning attack are in Figure 3.
(1) The zombie sends a packet to create a mapping in the
NAT table; in the example in Figure 4 we assume arbitrarily
that port 6666 was selected.
(2) Then, Oscar at address 6.6.6.6 sends 216 packets with
a spoofed source IP of 8.8.8.8, s.t., each is sent to a differ-
ent port of the NAT and each contains the destination port
in payload; only the packet with port 6666 arrives at the
zombie.
(3) The zombie increments this port by 1, in our example
the result is 6667, and sends it to Oscar; this is the external
port that will be allocated by the NAT to the subsequent
DNS request of the resolver to the victim name server.
This phase allows to bypass the SPR defense.
3. TCP INJECTIONS
The recent off-path TCP injection attacks operate in two
phases:
 Learn Connection 4-Tuple. Oscar, the off-path attacker,
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Figure 4: Predict-then-Poison DNS Attack Assum-
ing Per-Destination NAT.
learns the four parameters of a TCP connection between a
client and a server, that is, their respective IP addresses and
ports.
 Learn Sequence Number(s). Oscar learns the current se-
quence number, for packets sent from the server to the client.
In some attacks, Oscar also learns the sequence number for
packets from the client to the server. In this phase Oscar
bypasses the initial sequence number randomisation defense,
which is implemented in all modern TCP/IP stacks.
Table 1 surveys the techniques used in recent injection
attacks for the two phases and their requirements (in paren-
theses). In the reminder of this section we present a simple
implementation for each phase.
3.1 Learn Connection 4-Tuple
In order to launch an injection attack, Oscar must first
identify a TCP connection between the victim client and server.
We describe the method of [8], which uses a puppet (script
restricted by browser sandbox) running on the client ma-
chine to open such a connection. Since Oscar chooses the
server, the server’s IP address and port are known. To find
the client’s IP, the puppet sends a request to Oscar’s site;
this request contains the client’s IP address.
The final challenge of this phase is to detect the client
port. Many clients, in particular, those running Windows,
assign ports to connections sequentially. The attack of [8]
uses the puppet to open a connection to Oscar’s remote site
before and after opening the connection to the victim server;
sequential port assignment allows Oscar to learn the client’s
port: Oscar observes p1 and p2, the client ports used in the
connection to his sites. If p2 = p1 +2, then he identifies that
the connection to the server is via port p1 + 1 (otherwise
Oscar restarts the attack).
3.2 Learn Sequence Numbers
The next step after identifying the victim-connection, is
learning one or both connection’s sequence numbers. Ob-
serving the sequence numbers directly from traffic requires
5Learn Connection 4-tuple Learn Sequence Numbers
klm [18]
Active probing for connection
(Windows client, no firewall)
Side channel
(Windows client)
Qian
et al. [21, 22]
Monitor connections,
e.g., with netstat
(Malware)
Read client system-counters,
(Malware; in [21] also seq. # checking firewall)
Gilad and
Herzberg [8]
Establish connection, exploit
sequential port allocation impl.
(Puppet, Windows client)
Side channel
(Puppet, Windows client)
Gilad and
Herzberg [11]
Establish connection,
client port de-randomization
(Puppet, client behind firewall)
Exploit browser behavior,
(Puppet, no TLS/SSL)
Table 1: Off-Path TCP Injection Attacks: Building Blocks. In parentheses: requirements.
an on-path attacker (eavesdropping capability); off-path at-
tacks use different methods to infer the sequence numbers.
We focus on the technique of [11] which exploits an under-
specification of HTTP to learn the client’s sequence number.
Background. As of HTTP 1.1, clients can send multi-
ple requests to the same web-server in pipeline over a single
(‘persistent’) HTTP connection. In order to allow browsers
to match between each response and the corresponding re-
quest, the server sends the responses exactly in the order in
which it received the requests. The browser (client) keeps a
FIFO queue of pending HTTP requests for each connection,
and handles them one by one, as follows. To handle a re-
quest, the browser reads the bytes in the TCP connection’s
receive-buffer (when they become available). The browser
expects to find the matching response in the beginning of
TCP’s receive-buffer and parses the response.
The HTTP standard does not specify what the browser
should do when the receive-buffer contains data which is not
a valid (‘parsable’) HTTP response. Many modern browsers
(including Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer) handle
this situation as follows: the browsers treat all available data
in the receive-buffer as payload of a response with the fol-
lowing ‘default’ HTTP header:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Length: available-data-size
The browsers return this ‘response’ to the requesting mod-
ule, normally, the rendering engine or a script/applet.
Sequence Number Learning. The learning phase has
two steps: Inject and Observe, see Figure 5. In the inject
step, Oscar injects data into the stream of HTTP responses
that the server sends to the client. This data is read in the
observe step, which allows Oscar to determine the server’s
sequence number.
(1) Inject step. Let wnd denote the browser’s receive-buffer
for the connection and |wnd| denote its size. In order to
inject the data, Oscar sends to the browser 2
32
|wnd| packets,
spoofed to appear to be from the server (on its victim-
connection with the client). The ith packet has server se-
quence number i · |wnd|; since the sequence number field
is 32-bits long, exactly one of these packets has a ‘valid’ se-
quence number, which falls within wnd; all the other packets
are discarded by the client. Each of Oscar’s packets contains
as payload page(i) which is a simple web-page defined as fol-
lows:
<HTML><BODY>
<iframe src = "oscar.com/i.html" />
</BODY></HTML>
Browser
(Client)
Browser
(Client)PuppetPuppet
Off-Path
Oscar
Off-Path
Oscar
payload       pad || page(i)
field source destination
IP Server Client
  seq #           
<iframe src = 
server.com/pg.html/>
1
payload  HTTP GET /pg.html
2
Injected data at 
beginning of wnd. payload       HTTP GET /i.html
After inject phase, 
browser keeps one 
`response' in wnd.
Responses shift 
wnd forward
payload  HTTP 404 (not found)
ServerServer
i⋅∣wnd∣
Figure 5: Sequence Number Learning Technique.
(2) Observe step. In this step, the puppet makes prevalent
requests to the server, until it reaches the data injected by
Oscar in the previous step. Each server-response that arrives
at the client shifts wnd forward; after several such responses
arrive, there is no gap of unreceived bytes between the in-
jected data and the beginning of wnd. Then, the browser
reads the injected-response, assuming that it corresponds to
the request.
The last server-response usually overwrites the beginning
of the injected data, therefore, the injected ‘response’ will
usually be corrupt. However, as noted above, many browsers
handle the injected data as payload ‘wrapped’ with a de-
fault header. When the browser renders page(i), it tries to
retrieve i.html from Oscar’s web-site (see Figure 5); provid-
ing to Oscar the value of i. In order to keep page(i) intact
despite the overwrite, when Oscar sends page(i) in the in-
ject step, he prepends to it an easily removable pad. The
value of i allows Oscar to compute the next server sequence
number that the client expects.
4. EXPLOITING INJECTION/POISONING
To conclude our discussion of off-path TCP injection and
DNS poisoning attacks, we briefly discuss some potential
exploits.
6Exploiting DNS poisoning is straightforward, e.g., see [16].
Both users and programs use DNS extensively to resolve
domain names - to obtain the IP address and communicate
with a server, or to obtain other DNS-indexed resource, often
security related , e.g., SPF policies or blacklists. DNS poi-
soning allows circumvention of these mechanisms, e.g., ‘hi-
jacking’ of connection requests meant for legitimate servers.
In particular, ‘hijacking’ can allow phishing, where a user
thinks he interacts with a trusted site, while he actually
deals with a fake site (exposing credentials, installing mal-
ware, etc.). Furthermore, the malicious mapping is kept for
the time (TTL) specified in the record, and in the common
case of a single cache used by many clients, the poisoning
impacts all of them.
Exploiting TCP injections is more challenging, since TCP
is a transport protocol and does not involve caching. How-
ever, in common scenarios, TCP injections can allow crit-
ical exploits. In particular, TCP injections suffice to cir-
cumvent Same Origin Policy, hijack ‘cookies’ and cause ex-
ecution of malicious scripts (XSS). Furthermore, to cause
long-term impact similar to DNS poisoning, attackers can
exploit caching of objects by web caches. By crafting the
HTTP headers of his response, Oscar can cache the spoofed
page and specify that it will be out-dated only after a long
time; furthermore, when using a web-cache, the impact can
be over many users. See details in [11].
5. CONCLUSIONS
The vulnerabilities presented in this work show that re-
lying on challenge-response mechanisms against off-path at-
tackers can often be circumvented. Specifically, the tech-
niques discussed in this work allow off-path attackers to cir-
cumvent the main challenge-response defenses: source port
randomisation and initial sequence number randomisation.
Our message is that defenses should be designed and anal-
ysed against the strongest MitM attackers. In particular, to
prevent these, and other unforeseen, vulnerabilities we rec-
ommend deployment of systematic, cryptographic defenses
for TCP and DNS.
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